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Abstract
Healthcare industry has evolved dramatically over the time. From being a “cottage
industry” to an “organized industry” has brought lot of changes. The changes have been both
good and bad. Among the problems that have surfaced in past couple of decades, rising
healthcare cost has been one of the most significant. The rising healthcare cost has been
documented to be a symptom of several factors. Since the inception of healthcare as an organized
industry several payment models for providers and hospitals have been adopted. Current
healthcare reforms have proposed new payments models to curb the rising cost and provide
consumer oriented healthcare.
The proposed payment models such as, bundled, capitation, PROMETHEUS, pay-forperformance and traditional model of fee-for-service, all have their merits and demerits. Some
are good for chronic and others for acute conditions, some provide bonuses to physicians for
high quality and efficient care where as others pay more for number of services used. Our
literature review has highlighted the lack of systemic study to analyze the effect of payment
models on reimbursement of physicians and hospitals. This study shows that no “single model”
can be implemented to serve all the stakeholders. The proposed optimization model is a strategic
tool that aligns dynamic patient population with existing reimbursement models and provides
information to providers to help them design favorable contracts with insurers. The model also
has a potential to help improve planning and operational activities of hospitals.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION & PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1 Background
Introduction of Balanced Budget Act (1997), PL 105-33) brought lot of changes in
hospitals in the U.S. The system that was introduced in 1983 promised to bring new ways in
which hospitals would get reimbursed. Some of it involved an experimental payment program
that waived small rural hospitals from prospective payment system and provided others with
incentives for providing treatment to uninsured and those under Medicare. The payment was
based on the system of Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) wherein patients with similar
conditions are grouped under one group.
Over the last 2 decades the deregulation of hospital pricing and the rise of managed care
have led to competition among the stake holders and between the stake holders. Hospitals and
insurers negotiate for contracts and these contracts vary significantly across insurers (Alan T.
Sorensen, 2001).With the adoption of Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983-1984, there
have been several evidences to show the insurance companies gaining more in terms of price
discounts from the hospitals than vice versa (McNamee, 1995; Loomis, 1994; Phelps, 1992).
“As of July 2010, the United States spent $2.6 trillion per year on healthcare” (Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, 2012) which was $2.3 trillion in 2009 (Truffer et. al.,. 2010). The rate of growth of
spending has been increasing at 2.1% more per year than the growth in Gross Domestic Product
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(GDP) for last 30 years. So in last three decades, the percent GDP attributable to healthcare has
doubled. If major policy changes are not made, experts predict that this spending will continue to
grow. The projections are that by 2040 33.3% of GDP will be spent on healthcare and by 2080 it
will increase to 50% (Ezekiel J. Emanuel, 2012).
The growth seems to be partly because of increased Medicaid spending and increase in
Medicare payments for providers. Pricewatercooper in its 2002 report concludes that medical
advances and consumer demand, government mandate and regulations, and litigation and risk
management are the key factors responsible for increase in healthcare cost. Per capita healthcare
spending in 2001 grew at 8.7 percent to $5035. According to Levit et. al., (2003), the public
funding was more than private funding by 1.2 percentage points in the same year. During the
year 2001 hospital spending increased 8.3 percent accounting for 30 percent of the increase in
total healthcare spending.
Major contributors for increase in hospital spending were growth in population, price and
also per capita increase in quantity of services consumed (Levit et. al., 2003). Further analysis
showed that population growth contributed only 0.9 percent, whereas quantities of services used
per capita increased by 4.2 percent up from 2.2 percent in 2000, which was the single major
contributor of increased hospital spending in 2001, followed by hospital specific inflation rise at
3.2 percent.
A large portion of healthcare expenditures that includes an increase in per capita
utilization of hospital services, are spent on waste and defective care (Schoen et. al., 2006),
which includes medical errors, and avoidable hospitalizations that cause patients to incur
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unnecessary services. As per recent report from the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) the cost of potentially preventable hospitalizations in 2006 was $30.8 billion.
According to Jiang et. al., (2006), 20% of Medicare admissions were due to preventable patient
conditions. In another study Jencks et. al., (2009) found that “almost 19.6 % of Medicare patients
incurred re-hospitalization with 30 days of their discharge”.
According to Weissman et. al., (1992) and Billings et. al., (1993) panels that compared
administrative records with full hospital charts and clinical experience have defined sets of
preventable admissions. A group of researchers from UCSF (University of California - San
Francisco)-Stanford Evidence Based Practice Center (2002) used scientific literature and
validation method to arrive at narrow set of hospital admissions with Prevention Quality
Indicator (PQI) conditions that include conditions such as asthma, bacterial pneumonia,
hypertension etc. According to de Brantes François et. al., (2010), “as much as 22% of the
healthcare expenditure is related to potentially avoidable complications such as hospital
admissions for patients with diabetes, ketoacidosis, amputation of gangrenous limbs, congestive
heart failure. Reducing avoidable complications by 10% could save $40 billion per year”.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have started addressing these
issues by removing payment adjustments that previously compensated hospitals for certain
hospital-acquired conditions (ECRI Institute 2008). Following their footsteps, private insurers
have adopted approach in the form of different reimbursement models to remove financial
incentives to practices that essentially lead to complications. This places accountability on all
stakeholders in the healthcare system.
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The three stake holders in the healthcare system are healthcare insurers, healthcare
providers (hospitals, physicians etc.) and the patients. The interaction between the three is
governed by a contract. Contract means there is an agreement wherein healthcare provider
promises to deliver the service to the set of people being covered and in turn is reimbursed by the
insurer according to agree upon conditions. Medicare and Medicaid are federal programs which
pay for the services provided to elderly, disabled, and low-income patients respectively. Services
to rest of the population are provided based on their coverage through private insurers.
According to the Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, almost 81 percent of the
revenue generated by provider is through CMS.
Since the introduction of Balanced Budget Act, the system where hospital and insurer
negotiate payment has become operationally competitive mechanism. Prior to this hospitals
would set their own prices and insurer would pay full payment for services. This model did not
require any kind of competition among third party insurers. Over the last 2 decades the
deregulation of hospital pricing and the rise of managed care have led to competition among the
stake holders and between these entities. There is a wide level of variation in the contracts
negotiated between service providers and insurers (Alan T. Sorensen, 2001).
According to Laffont and Martimort (2001), principle-agent framework is the model that
is usually followed to design the healthcare payment systems. The interactions between the
insurer and provider are where an insurer (a principle) provides instructions and guidelines for
providing patients’ medical services to a provider (an agent). It is the insurer’s responsibility to
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formulate a contract that incentivizes patient’s prospective health. These incentives provide the
motivation towards best practices applied towards well-being of patient.
In the United States people are either insured by private commercial insurers or their
government counterparts like Medicare and Medicaid or are uninsured. The coverage is taken
either directly or indirectly and is generally bought through a sponsor. Sponsors in turn write
different contracts with healthcare insurers wherein they can either buy partial or full coverage as
prescribed in their coverage plan. Healthcare insurers in turn write different contract(s),
essentially buying services of healthcare providers and pay them as per the design of the contract
(Born et. al.,, 2004) as explained in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Design of healthcare contract (Source: Contract Optimization at Texas
Children’s Hospital. Interfaces, 2004)
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Insurer writes a specific contract with each provider in the network who is generally paid
based on per unit of care which could be either per DRG or per inpatient day. The contracts are
provider specific and negotiated annually. This also varies across insurers for given providers
(Ho, 2009).
The selective nature of contracts is intended to control costs and insurers prefer to
contract with hospitals that provide quality care to patients. The drawback of managed care
system which started with the enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, is
that the selective nature of contracts also give power to insurers to exclude providers from their
network thus negotiating for lower provider price (Brooks et. al.,, 1997).
“It is known that healthcare providers have some say for the rates provided by Medicare
and Medicaid. There is not much in literature about the bargaining process that goes on between
the provider and insurer. According to Ho (2009), there are several stages in the process to
design a contract between insurer and a provider”:
Stage 1: Hospital makes price offer to contracts.
Stage 2: Contracts choose their hospital networks.
Stage 3: Contracts set premiums.
Stage 4: Consumers and employers jointly choose contracts.
Stage 5: Stick consumers visit hospitals; contracts pay per service provided.
After conducting several interviews with insurers and providers, Ho concluded that
providers with high patient satisfaction rate are in a position to demand higher rate of
reimbursement. Provider seeks to increase revenue and therefore tend to contract with insurers
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offering better prices and preferred patients. Despite all the posturing by providers, the leverage
is generally skewed towards insurers.
There are several reimbursement plans/models proposed. Some of them have been in use
for a long time but never got prominence and others have been proposed recently after recent
changes in healthcare policy. The common focus in all the models is quality, and/or efficiency of
care provided to the patients in the process of care (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008).
According to the report, making healthcare more efficient would be in terms of rate of utilization
of services, such as, radiology, utilization of emergency department; overall expenditures, or
medical errors.
This paradigm shift in healthcare policy has radically affected the modes by which stake
holders involved in healthcare get benefited, such as hospitals, physicians, patients etc. Different
reimbursement models solve the cost Vs. quality differently. As can be seen in Figure 1.2 there is
no standard or one particular solution to the situation.
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Figure 1.2: Cost Vs quality and reimbursement models (Source: Which Healthcare
Payment System is Best?, CHQPR)

1.2 Reimbursement Models
1.2.1 Fee-For-Service
Fee for service as the name suggests means insurer pays for services rendered by the
provider based on Clinical Practice Guideline (CPG). The price of the services is established by
negotiation between insurer and provider. Charges for all the services that a provider provides
are generally listed on their fee schedule, which is based on set of 5 digit codes called Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT).
In an ideal world it could be a good model for reimbursing providers,
however for the most part it is the insurer who makes a decision of how much each service
should be paid and hence the provider feels underpaid. On the other hand there is equally high
likelihood of over utilization of services and the model is more prone to be volume driven than
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value driven. Although this model has weaknesses, it is still the most common methods of
reimbursing providers.
1.2.2 PROMETHEUS
PROMETHEUS which stands for Provider Payment Reform for Outcomes Margins
Evidence Transparency Hassle-reduction Excellence Understandability and Sustainability was
result of a joint effort of a team composed of insurers and providers (Massachusetts Medical
Society, 2008). This model is a modification for fee-for-service payment model. The physicians
are paid for fee for service, but also receive high bonuses for providing uncomplicated and
efficient care to the patients (described in detail in chapter 2).
The model is arguably the most advanced payment reimbursement model currently
available. The model is based on Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs). CPGs include guidelines
for the process and resources required to treat a specific condition (Massachusetts Medical
Society, 2008).
1.2.3 Bundled Payment
This is also called as “episode of care” or “case rate” payment. This means a single
bundled payment made for a specific condition such as knee replacement or kidney transplant
etc. The episode could include different specialists, different facilities, post-operative care etc.
involved in an “episode”. The payment is typically made to the hospitals, which divide it among
providers involved in the care. In case the total cost of care is less than the bundled payment, the
profit is shared among all. Similarly loss is shared among all in case the cost exceeds the bundled
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payment. This kind of model is appropriate for acute cases such as heart attack, the conditions
that have clear beginning and an end (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). In such a condition,
under this model a single payment would be made to the provider.
Although this model has drawbacks, the model works better than global payment
model in certain cases, such as, acute conditions or different acute episodes of chronic
conditions. The difference between “episode of care” or bundled payment model is that risk is
shared by both insurers and physicians (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008).
According to a report, The Medicare bundled payments for care improvement initiative:
An analysis and its implications to potential participants (2011), there are four different types of
bundled payment models based on whether the patient is being treated for an acute or chronic
condition. They are –
Model 1: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Care. This payment model involves
only acute-care inpatient hospitalization. The episode of care begins with patient’s
hospitalization and ends with his/her discharge.
Model 2: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Plus post-Acute Care. This model
includes acute-care hospitalization and post-acute care following and associated with acute-care
episode. Post-acute care can have two options, with option 1 the episode ends before 90 days of
and in option 2 the episode ends after 90 days of hospital discharge.
Model 3: Retrospective Post-Acute Care Only. The payment in this model is limited to
the episode of only post-acute care following an inpatient hospital stay. It begins with the
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services provided at skilled nursing home, long-term care hospital etc. 30 days after patient
discharge.
Model 4: Prospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Only. This model is like Model 1
wherein, the episode of care starts with patient’s hospitalization. And the episode ends upon
discharge from the acute care hospital and includes all Part A and Part B services provided
during patient’s stay.
Table 1.1 below summarizes the reimbursement models, their method of reimbursement,
their benefits and concerns.
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Table 1.1: Summary, benefits and concerns of Bundled and PROMETHEUS payment models
Model Name

Bundled
Payments or
Episode of care
or Case rate
payment

Summary

Method of payment

Benefits

Concerns

Other Comments

Payment covers
particular episode of
care, such as myocardial
infarction or a hip
replacement

A bundled payment is
made to a hospital,
which divides the
payment between the
hospital and all of the
providers who cared
for the patient

Hopefully it will
give providers a
great incentive to
coordinate care,
thus improving
outcomes and
reducing waste and
unnecessary care

Physicians worry that
hospitals will get
lion's share and those
not affiliated with
hospitals or network
will find it difficult to
participate

How to divide the money
fairly?

Multiple Providers in
multiple settings may
share in the payment for
a patient's episode of
care

Doctors and hospital
share the differences,
whether it is profit or
loss

Very sick patients
might get shunned as
they are very
expensive to be
treated

How do you prevent
providers from being
biased and cherry
picking patients with
good prognosis etc.?

Access to specialist
could be limited and
defining "episode of
care" can be difficult
for certain illnesses
and chronic
conditions

How to define "episode
of care"?

Physicians need the
infrastructure to
make this model
work

It's strength is that it
promotes clinical
collaboration and
coordination of care
across specialties and
settings of care
It's success depends on
whether its incentives
will follow evidencebased guidelines will
enough waste to fund
quality-based bonuses
for physicians

An episode of care could
encompass a period of
hospitalization,
hospitalization + postacute case, or a defined
time frame of care for a
chronic condition
it rewards physicians for
practicing efficiently and
avoiding complications
PROMETHEU
S Payment

teams negotiate allinclusive case rates
according to evidencebased guidelines for
episodes of acute and
long term care

Physicians are paid fee
for service, which is a
debit against the case
rate

Physicians can share a
withhold if their team
prevents avoidable
complications

Physicians stand to
receive bonuses for
high quality,
efficient care
without being at
financial risk
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1.3 Problem Statement
Almost two thirds of Americans have health insurance plan of one form or other
highlighting the importance of understanding the competitive interaction between insurers and
providers (Quinn, 1998). Competition is not only between insurers and providers but also within
insurers and providers. The research done in the past e.g., Pauly (1987, 1988a, 1988b), Staten et.
al.,, (1987, 1988) and Melnich et. al.,, (1992), shows there is a significant correlation between
competition and prices in market. The insurance reimbursement plans play a very important role
(Burns and Wholey, 1992). Negotiating the terms of reimbursement in contract depends
significantly on market power helped by the stake holders.
“The maximum revenue generated from a hospital’s perspective comes from the contract
terms established by them with private insurers. The number of contract portfolio maintained by
the provider or healthcare provider system can range anywhere from 50 up to 200 with different
revenues. With so much revenue at stake, it becomes important to design a contract in such a
way that it gets maximized. Reimbursement contract in no ways guarantees the number of
patients, but the rate of reimbursement for the service provided” (Born, 2004).
To improve accountability in the delivery of healthcare, Medicare & Medicaid and
private insurers have developed several reimbursement plans/models as mentioned above. These
models are based on “Evidence-informed Case Rates (ECRs) which is a single, risk-adjusted,
prospective or retrospective, payment given to providers across inpatient and outpatient settings
to care for a patient diagnosed with a specific condition. Payment amounts are based on the
resources required to provide care as recommended in well-accepted clinical guidelines” (de
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Brantes, F., 2007). The common denominator for all the ECRs is the window of time period
during which any relevant (whether typical or Potentially Avoidable Condition (PAC))
readmission of patient will be reimbursed. The window of time period varies with the model of
reimbursement as shown in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3: Depiction of number of days covered under each reimbursement model

Designing a contract that maximizes patient’s health outcomes while allowing the other
two stake holders to optimize their own objective functions depend on several factors including
reimbursements provided by insurer to the provider. Reimbursement is a complex process that
involves many factors not only related to patients’ condition but also different cost structures
providers have.
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All the reimbursement models, considered in the research, provide a chance for both
insurers as well as providers to share the savings and thus increasing their revenue by reducing or
preventing PACs. The purpose of the research is to design an optimization model, using all the
reimbursement models, to maximize the revenue. The optimization model aligns dynamic patient
population with existing reimbursement models and provides information to providers to help
them design not only favorable contracts with insurers but also help improve their planning and
operational activities. The model will also help in hospitals in strategizing their revenues through
reimbursements.
1.4 Research Justification
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), popularly known as Obama
care or Affordable Care Act (ACA), was signed into law on March 23, 2010. The law aims at
improving the quality and increasing the affordability of health insurance. The law also aims to
reduce escalating healthcare costs and improve healthcare outcomes by moving from current
quantity driven system to more quality driven system. This can be achieved by increasing
competition, regulation, and incentives to streamline the delivery of healthcare. The changes
enacted include restructuring of Medicare reimbursement from fee-for-service to bundled
payment (Wikipedia). Effective October 1, 2012, CMS had begun Readmission Reduction
Program, which penalizes IPP.S hospitals with excess readmissions.
The deregulation of prices in hospitals in the last two decades and emergence of managed
care plans introduced selective contracting into the hospital market. Not all the hospitals get the
contract and the decision largely depends on services, amenities, quality and price. In a recent
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article “The future of U.S. healthcare (The Wall Street Journal, Monday, December 12, 2011),
the author has cited many examples where individual physician practices are shutting down. The
hospitals are increasingly merging with other hospitals, and they are signing contract with
employers. Insurance companies on the other hand are trying to acquire hospitals or signing new
payment terms. In short the lines of distinction between hospitals and insurance companies are
getting blurred.
There is a contract between a provider and insurer, whenever an individual gets services
from a provider, insurer pays provider based on the contract terms. It has become overly
important for both hospitals and insurance companies to look at their contractual terms for their
better future. The above discussed models are not free from shortcomings. They all have
advantages for one and risks for others, as summarized in Table 1.1. This research intends to use
Industrial Engineering skills and the knowledge of Operations Research to develop an
optimization model which will help providers design favorable contracts with insurers.
1.5 Expected Results
The model will help providers choose a reimbursement model or the combination of
models from the mix of available reimbursement models that is best for their dynamic patient
population and the facility, by:
a. helping providers in assessing reimbursement based on DRGs,
b. helping providers choose among different insurers, and
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c. helping providers in deciding future investment (based of increase in number of
patients from particular DRG or more profitable DRG, by increasing number of beds etc.) thus
making them more competitive in market.
The rest of the manuscript is organized in several chapters. Chapter 2 deals with an
extensive literature review with two parts. First part explains the available and proposed
reimbursement models in healthcare. The section also enlists advantages and disadvantages of
the models. Second part explains several techniques that have been used for negotiations in other
industries in detail. The chapter also explain how DEA has been used in healthcare in general but
has not been used for optimizing reimbursement plans in particular.
Chapter 3 is about methodology, classical Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and in
combination with Principal Component Analysis (PCA DEA), used for designing optimization
model. It explain in detail the formulation of optimization model.
In chapter 4 results obtained using DEA optimization model will be discussed. The
chapter will explain advantages and disadvantages of the optimization model also discusses how
DEA optimization model can help providers negotiate a contract with insurers that allows them
to maximize their profit by reducing PACs.
Finally the manuscript will be concluded with suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Section 1
Inpatient reimbursement is calculated based a system called Acute Care Hospital
Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). The way IPPS works is explained hereunder, the
information gathered here is collected from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’
Department of Health and Human Services.
2.1 Background
A contract is written between a provider and Medicare to set acute IPP.S rates which a
facility accepts. The contract covers the episode of care beneficiaries for 90 days of care per
episode with an additional 60 days lifetime reserve. The episode of begins when a beneficiary is
admitted and it ends when patient has been out of the facility for 60 consecutive days.
2.1.1 Basis of IPP.S Payment
The reimbursement received by the hospital for inpatients is either per case or per
discharge based. “All the outpatient diagnostic services and admission related non-diagnostic
services provided by the facility or an entity that is wholly owned or operated by the admitting
facility on the date of patient’s inpatient admission or within 3 days immediately preceding the
admission must be included in the IPP.S claim”.
For each patient hospital treats it files a claim to the Medicare Administrative Contractor
(MAC). Based on the information on the claim MAC categorizes each case into Diagnostic
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Related Group (DRG). DRG is a classification system was developed by Robert Barclay Fetter
and John D. Thompson at Yale University with the material support of the former Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), now called the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) (Wikipedia). The DRG is determined with the help of a principal diagnosis and/or up to
24 comorbidities (secondary diagnosis). It is also affected by up to 25 procedures furnished by
the facility during the stay of the patient. The CMS reviews the definitions of DRGs annually
and make required changes.
Since October 1, 2007, CMS has started using new DRG system called Medicare
Severity (MS)-DRG, which takes severity of illness and consumption of resources into
consideration when assigning the DRG. Assigning the severity is based on secondary diagnosis
which has 3 levels to it:
MCC – Major Complication/ Comorbidity, which reflect the highest level of severity,
CC - Complication/ Comorbidity, which is the next level of severity, and
Non-CC – Non-Complication/ Comorbidity, which do not significantly affect severity of
illness and resources used.
2.1.2 Fee-For-Service Model (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2009)

Fee-For-Service (FFS) as the name suggests means insurer pays for services rendered by
the provider based on CPG. The price of the services is established by negotiation between
insurer and provider. Charges for all the services that a provider provides are generally listed on
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their fee schedule, which is based on set of 5 digit codes called Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT).
In an ideal world it could be a good model for reimbursing providers, however for the
most part it is the insurer who makes a decision of how much each service should be paid and
hence provider feels underpaid. On the other hand there is equally high likelihood of over
utilization of services and the model is more prone to be volume driven than value driven.
Although this model has weaknesses, it is still the most common methods of reimbursing
providers.
2.1.2.1 How do hospitals get paid under Medicare?

Medicare Part A Prospective payment system is method by which weight is given to
DRGs submitted by hospital to CMS for claims submitted for the payment for the services
provided to the patient. The Flow of information is shown in Figure 2.1 below. Similar method is
followed by most of the private insurers which also works on DRGs.
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How Prospective Payment System Works
Hospital/
Physician

Medicare/
Fiscal Intermediary

CMS

Patient w/ Condition

Physician/ Hospital

Fiscal Intermediary

Medicare Code
Editor
(Claim Processing
System)

Medicare provides
Analysis & Review
file to CMS

CMS assigns
“weight”
to DRG

1' Diagnosis
2' Diagnosis
Complications
Co-morbidities

Screening of
cases by
system

Medical record
assigns
Diagnostic &
Procedure
Code from ICD

“Grouper”
All the discharge
cases assigned 1 of
25 MDCs

Claim Form
UB-92

Assigning 1 of 499
DRGs

PPS = Prospective Payment System
CMS = Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services
DRG = Diagnostic Related Group
MDC = Major Diagnostic Categories
Fiscal Intermediary = Private Company
contacted by Medicare to process
bills and pay claims for
Medicare Part A services
Grouper = an algorithm used by Fiscal
Intermediary to group all the
discharges into one of the MCDs

Figure 2.1: Flow of information from Hospital to CMS to claim DRGs

There is a complex formula to calculate the payment for hospital using DRGs by CMS,
described in Figure 2.2 below. DRGs are classified according to the affected organ system,
surgical procedure performed in patients, morbidity and sex of the patients. The system can
account for 9 diagnoses per case, 1 primary and up to 8 diagnoses during the stay in the hospital.
The system can also account for up to 6 procedures. DRGs cover both labor and no-labor costs
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(bundle services) and routine operating costs, such as, patient care, routine nursing services,
room and boarding, diagnostics, ancillary services etc.

How Prospective Payment System Works
Calculating DRG weights
- patient charges are standardized to remove effects of the regional area wage differences
- indirect medical education costs
- additional payment to hospitals that treat a large percentage of low income patients (“disproportionate share
payments”)
- the cases outside 3 standard deviations are eliminated
- disproportionate share payments
- whether the hospital is a sole community hospital,
Medicare dependent rural hospital (depends on Medicare for atleast 60% of its patient days or discharges), or
a regional referral hospital
Average standard charge =

Weighting factor =

sum of charges of all cases in the DRG
# of cases classified in the DRG
Average charge of each DRG
National average standardized charge per case

Hospital Payment = DRG weight x hospital’s payment rate/case (“large urban” or “other”)

Hospital Payment = DRG weight x standardized amount
where,
standardized amount = a “labor component” (representing labor cost variation among different
parts of the country)
+
a “non-labor component” (representing geographic calculation based on
whether the hospital is located in a large urban or other area)
+
if applicable:
cost outlier + disproportionate share + indirect medical education Payments

Note: DRG system does not include some specialized hospitals, such as, psychiatric, cancer, long-term care,
children’s, and rehabilitation hospitals

Figure 2.2: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to DRGs submitted to CMS
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2.1.2.2 How do physicians get paid under Medicare?
Medicare Part B pays physicians based on CPT codes submitted by physicians’ office to
CMS for services provided to the patients. CMS in turn uses Resource-based Relative Value
Scale (RBRVS) to assign relative weight to each code, which is later used in a formula to
calculate dollar value for each CPT code submitted, as shown in Figure 2.3. This is a bottom-up
methodology followed by CMS.

Bottom-up Methodology

CPT Codes

Physician Office

Insurance Company

CMS

RBRVS assigns relative
wt. to each code

Relative Value Units
(RVUs)
- Physician Work (work)
- Practice Expense (PE)
- Malpractice Expense (MP)

Facility

Direct
- Clinical labor
- Medical Supplies
- Medical Equipment

Non-Facility

Indirect
- Administration
- Office expense
- All other expenses

Direct
- Clinical labor
- Medical Supplies
- Medical Equipment

Indirect
- Administration
- Office expense
- All other expenses

[(RVU work*GPCI work) +
(RVU PE*GPCI PE) +
(RVU MP*GPCI MP)] CF

Figure 2.3: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to CPT codes submitted to CMS
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2.1.3 Bundled Payments (Reese, 2010)
The Bundled Payments for Care Improvements Initiative was launched by CMS on
August 23, 2011. The idea was to explore and study four distinct bundled payment models in an
effort to achieve better health, better care, and reduced expenditures. Of the four models, as
summarized in Table 2.1 below, three of them utilize a “retrospective” payment model in which
Medicare makes a discounted traditional fee-for-service payment (in an agreement between CMS
and the participant provider), which is subsequently reconciled against a target price. The fourth
payment model uses a “prospective” payment approach, under which CMS makes a single
bundled payment to the participating provider for an entire episode of care in lieu of traditional
Part A and Part B fee-for-service payments. More importantly, CMS may permit gain sharing in
all four models.
This is also called as “episode of care” or “case rate” payment. This means a single bundled
payment made for a specific condition such as knee replacement or kidney transplant etc. The
episode could include different specialists, different facilities, post-operative care etc. involved in
an “episode”. The payment is typically made to the hospitals, which divide it among providers
involved in the care. This kind of model is appropriate for acute cases such as heart attack, the
conditions that have clear beginning and an end (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). In such a
condition, under this model a single payment would be made to the provider.
Although this model has its drawbacks, but the model works well in certain cases, such
as, acute conditions or different acute episodes of chronic conditions as explained in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Variables for which the provider is at risk under alternative payment systems
(Source: From Volume to Value, NRHI, 2009)

According to a report, The Medicare bundled payments for care improvement initiative:
An analysis and its implications to potential participants (2011), there are four different types of
bundled payment models based on whether the patient is being treated for an acute or chronic
condition. They are –
2.1.4.1 Model 1: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay only

The episode of care in this model is focused on acute-care inpatient hospitalization. The
episode of care begins with patient’s admission in a hospital and ends with his/her discharge
from the hospital. It includes all Part A services furnished by the hospital (regardless of their
particular MS-DRG) during patient’s stay including diagnostic and related services provided in 3
days prior to admission by the hospital and/or any entity wholly owned or operated by the
hospital.
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2.1.4.2 Model 2: Retrospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Plus Post-Acute Care

This model extends the episode of care to include both acute-care hospitalization as well
as post-acute care following and associated with the acute-care episode. Unlike Model 1, Model
2 also includes physician and other Part B services associated with the episode for previously
agreed upon MS-DRGs.
The episode begins with the admission of the patient and continues for a minimum of 30
days post-discharge. Hospital has 2 options to choose with respect to end of episode of care. In
Option 1, the episode will end between 30 – 89 days post discharge and in Option 2, the episode
will end a minimum of 90 days post discharge. The episode includes all Part A and Part B
services provided during patient’s stay in the hospital as well as related services provided during
post-discharge period including related readmissions.
2.1.4.3 Model 3: Retrospective Post-Acute Care Only

The episode of care is limited only to post-acute care following an acute inpatient
hospital stay. The episode under the model begins with initiation of post-acute care services at a
skilled nursing facility, inpatient rehabilitation facility, long-term care hospital, or home health
agency within 30 days of patient’s discharge from an acute care hospital for an agreed upon MSDRG.
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2.1.4.4 Model 4: Prospective Acute Care Hospital Stay Only
“Model covers both Part A and Part B services furnished during episode of care. Like in
Model 1, the episode of care involves only the “acute inpatient hospital stay” and it begins upon
patient’s hospital admission. However, unlike Model 1, there is no clarity on when the episode of
care ends in Model 4. First, the indication is that the episode ends upon discharge for the acute
care hospital and includes all Part A and Part B services provided during patient’s stay, including
services rendered during Medicare 3-day window payment bundling rule. Episode of care in
Model 4 also includes Part A and Part B services provided during “related admissions”, but
“post-discharge” period is to be defined by the hospital for the agreed upon MS-DRGs in the
beginning of contract. In contrast to Model 1, Model 4 includes one single prospective bundled
payment for both Part A and Part B services’.
As mentioned earlier there are 4 types of bundled payment models. Table 2.1, shows the
methodology for calculating amount to be paid under all the 4 models.
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Table 2.1: Calculating Dollar amount with respect to Bundle Model of Payment
MODEL 1 – Inpatient
Stay Only
Physician group practices
Acute care hospitals paid
under the IPP.S
Health systems
Physician-hospital
organizations
Conveners of
participating healthcare
providers

MODEL 2 – Inpatient Stay +
Post-discharge Services
Physician group practices
Acute care hospitals paid under
the IPP.S
Health systems
Physician-hospital organizations
Conveners of participating
healthcare providers
Post-acute providers

Payment of
Bundle and
Target Price
Clinical
Conditions
Targeted
Types of
Services
Included in
Bundle

Discounted IPP.S payment
No separate target price

Expected
Discount
Provided to
Medicare

To be proposed by the
applicant
CMS requires minimum
discounts increasing from 0
% in first 6 months to 2 %
in year 3
Acute care hospital:
IPP.S payment less predetermined discount
Physician: Traditional fee
schedule payment (not
included in episode)

FEATURE
Eligible
Awardees

Payment from
CMS to
providers

MODEL 4 – Inpatient Stay Only

Retrospective comparison of target
price and actual FFS payments

MODEL 3 – Post-discharge
Services Only
Physician group practices
Acute care hospitals paid under
the IPP.S
Health systems
Physician-hospital organizations
Conveners of participating
healthcare providers
Long-term care hospitals
Inpatient rehabilitation facilities
Skilled nursing facilities
Retrospective comparison of target
price and actual FFS payments

ALL MS-DRGs

Applicants to propose based on
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay

Applicants to propose based on
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay

Applicants to propose based on
MS-DRG or inpatient hospital stay

Inpatient hospital services

Inpatient hospital and physician
services
Related post-acute care services
Related readmissions
Other services defined in the
bundle
To be proposed by the applicant
CMS requires minimum discount
of 3 % for 30 – 89 days post
discharge episode, 2 % for 90 days
or longer episode
Traditional fee-for-service
payment to all providers and
suppliers, subject to reconciliation
with predetermined target price

Post-acute care services
Related readmissions
Other services defined in the
bundle

Physician group practices
Acute care hospitals paid under
the IPP.S
Health systems
Physician-hospital organizations
Conveners of participating
healthcare providers

Prospectively set payment

Inpatient hospital and physician
services
Related readmissions

To be proposed by applicant

To be proposed by applicant
Subject to minimum discount of
3%
Larger discount for MS-DRGs in
ACE Demonstration

Traditional fee-for-service
payment to all providers and
suppliers, subject to reconciliation
with predetermined target price

Prospectively established bundled
payment to admitting hospital;
hospitals distribute payments from
bundled payment
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2.1.5 PROMETHEUS Payment (Terry, 2010)
PROMETHEUS which stands for Provider Payment Reform for Outcomes Margins
Evidence Transparency Hassle-reduction Excellence Understandability and Sustainability was
result of a joint effort of a team composed of stakeholders (Massachusetts Medical Society,
2008). This model is a modification of fee-for-service payment model. The physicians are paid
for fee for service, but also receive high bonuses for providing uncomplicated and efficient care
to the patients.
The model is arguably the most advanced payment reimbursement model currently
available. The model is based on guidelines established by Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs).
CPGs include guidelines for all the steps, resources etc. required to treat a specific condition. The
difference between “episode of care” or bundled payment model is that it risk is shared by both
insurers and physicians (Massachusetts Medical Society, 2008).
PROMETHEUS Payment intends to fix the shortcomings rather than replacing the two
most prevalent payment models in the US, namely Fee-for-service and capitation. The models
attempts to create a payment structure where providers and insurers get incentivized when they
do the right thing for the patients.
There are three important improvements over the previous models which differentiate it
from them.
-

Evidence-based guidelines are setup as a basis for establishing case rate, which

also includes patient severity of disease. Outstanding performance can get more than 100% of
the case rate.
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-

Model encourages integration of services around the patient measured on the

basis of clinical process, outcomes of care, patient experience with care received and sometimes
cost efficiency.
-

The structure of the model encompasses a wide range of specialties from large

integrated delivery networks to individual practitioners.
In Figure 2.5, PROMETHEUS model pays providers based on the most of the resources
required to deliver CPG based care, which is an ECR. The model uses ECR to determine the
total resources required to deliver clinical appropriate care. ECR calculates payment for the
whole time patient stays in the hospital. After the payment amount has been negotiated for a
provider treating within an ECR, provider has two methods of payment – prospective, and feefor-service with retrospective reconciliation. It is up to provider to choose the payment
mechanism.
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Establishing ECR

PROMETHEUS
Services in Clinical Practice Guideline
(CPG)

Average prevalent price in market of those services
from current national claim data
+
Increase to account for normal variation in patients
+
variation in resource utilization in Rx for same
condition

Payment Mechanism

Prospective
- payment depends on the ECR triggered
- subjected to Performance contingency
fund
- 90 % of the monthly bargained for chronic
conditions, or
80 % of the monthly bargained for acute
conditions + quality payment

Retrospective (Fee-for-Service)
- reconciliation at the conclusion of the
ECR for savings as measured in the
scoreboard
- subjected to Performance contingency
fund
- 10 % - 20 % reductions are applicable

Of the Providers total payment for that patient
- for chronic conditions contingency fund is 10 %
- for acute conditions contingency fund is 20 %
Foot Note
- Comprehensive Scoreboard maintained by Hospital
- Top performers get > 100 % Evidence-based Case Rate (ECR)
Poor performers get < 100% ECR
- trigger comes from CPT & ICD – 9 codes sent for claim

Figure 2.5: PROMETHEUS Model of Payment
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Section 2
Reimbursement rates negotiated by hospitals and insurers are regarded as trade secrets
which are rarely made available to public. For this apparent reason there has been little research
analyzing variation in rates among insurers. Melnick et. al., (1992) focused on the influence of
hospital competition on discounts offered by analyzing the data on negotiated per diem rates
across hospitals for California’s largest PP.O. They used Hirschman-Herfindahl indexes to
measure hospital competition. MEDSTAT database consisting of claims from employees of selfinsured firms was analyzed for payment rates for appendectomies performed in the hospital.
Using limited data covering few insurers for large number of hospitals, the authors were able to
conclude factors determining bargaining power of providers e.g. hospital concentration,
ownership type, affiliations etc. (Brooks et. al.,, 1997).
In contrast to the studies mentioned, Staten et. al., (1998) focused on determinants of
insurer bargaining power. The authors argue that size of insurer alone is not enough to get
discounts from the hospital. “Insurer must be able to credibly threaten to send its patients
elsewhere.” Sometimes the patient may be more loyal to a hospital than to an insurer and in that
case even managed care organizations may not be able to enforce such a threat. Alan T. Sorensen
(2001) analyzed the data from state of Connecticut and not to his surprise Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) were able to get bigger
discounts which increase with the size of insurer. He also concluded size alone is not the
determinant of discount and it requires insurers’ ability to channel the patients to selected
providers. He also found “charges incurred by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) tend to be
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highly skewed toward hospitals with which discounts have been negotiated, and more highly
skewed allocations tend to be associated with larger discounts.” Contrary to the conventional
wisdom in the healthcare industry that “volume is the king”, the econometric model suggested
that “patient channeling” is more important in determining discounts than the insurer size.
A model is a representation of relationship between different variables, they are generally
theoretical. In economics, underlying structural parameters are used to construct a simplified
framework of complex processes. Mathematical techniques are often used to show the
interaction between a set of variables (Wikipedia). Operations research which is also referred to
as decision science employs various techniques and tools to arrive at optimal or near optimal
solutions. Some of the tools or methods used in operations research are optimization, probability
theory, queuing theory, game theory, graph theory, decision analysis, mathematical modeling
and simulation. The use of technique depends on various factors, such as, nature of the system,
the goals of improvement, and constraints on time (bls.gov).
The chosen problem in healthcare can be compared to a scenario in which there are
multiple firms (hospitals) selling same product (services) trying to attract customers (patients)
from a common pool. There are several constraints involved, like capacity (number of beds,
physicians, nurses, etc.), specialty if any (pediatric hospital, cancer hospital, etc.), insurance
company coverage and their contracts etc. Processes in healthcare are more often stochastic in
nature and hence there is always a possibility of choosing one path over the other. A model could
be either quantitative or qualitative according to its intended purpose or function. There are many
models that have been developed to solve such a problem in different industries.
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Pauly and Redisch (1973), their work still serves as the basis of modeling the hospitalphysician interaction in economics. In their model they considered hospitals as cooperative
organization largely run by physicians having control of hospital resources. Their model was
clearly meant to work to maximize physicians’ income and hence had lot of drawbacks.
According to Brooks et. al., (1997) there is a potential gain from negotiations by both
insurers and provider. They used Nash-bargaining model to estimate hospital-insurer negotiation
over prices. They concluded that hospitals have relatively more bargaining power than insurers
because of the greater enrollment of population in HMOs that has positive impact on the hospital
bargaining power with respect to Fee-for-service plans. However there were some
methodological issues with the study, like the model considered the relationship to be bilateral
monopoly instead of bilateral oligopoly, and there are no generalizations of Nash-bargaining
model for the former. This concern reduces the applicability of the model to the real world
healthcare market.
Morrisey (2001) concluded selective nature of contracts between healthcare insurers and
providers has provided formers to obtain lower prices from HMOs. He also concludes that the
findings are not only generalizable but also stringer when there is more competition in hospital
market. This potentially means insurers can threaten hospitals by removing them from their
network.
Several techniques have been utilized previously to study the process of negotiation
between market players and most of them have applied in manufacturing and service industries.
Wang and Zionts (2008) considered a problem which had one buyer and many sellers, called
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“one-to-many negotiation problem”. They used BATNA (Best Alternatives To a Negotiated
Agreement) to measure the strength of negotiation and also developed guidelines to help in the
bargaining process. Using this technique, they were not only able to measure strength of
negotiation but also settle on one criterion from several available alternatives.
Stanley Zionts (1979) authored an article “MCDM-If not a Roman Numeral, then What?”
MCDM or MCDA stands for Multiple Criteria Decision Making or Multiple Criteria Decision
Analysis. It is a field of operations research that deals with multiple criterions while making
decisions. One of the major uses of the technique is negotiating cost or price. Since the problem
involving multiple criterions do have a specific solution, it provides several options to decision
maker to choose from.
According to Wallenius et. al., (2008), the potential of MCDM is being explored in new
areas of research and application such as, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), negotiation
science, e-commerce, finance, and engineering. They went on further to say that DEA has gained
so much importance that its relationship with Multiple Objective Linear Programming (MOLP)
is also being explored.
One of the pioneering works in the field of goal programming and DEA was conducted
by Charnes and Cooper (Charnes and Cooper, 1961; Charnes et. al., 1978). The basic difference
between MOLP and DEA lies in the fact that former uses more general nonradial projections
compared to radial projections used in the later technique. In other words, MOLP is more generic
and can be used in benchmarking studies. Whereas DEA is more specific and is used for
performance measurement of available alternatives (Joro et. al., 1998).
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2.6 Data envelopment analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric productive efﬁciency measurement
method for operations with multiple inputs and multiple outputs (Liu et. al., 2013). According to
Seiford (1996), DEA in its current form was ﬁrst described in Charnes et. al., (1978), who
proposed a novel method that combines and transforms multiple inputs and outputs into a single
efﬁciency index. This approach ﬁrst establishes an “efﬁcient frontier” formed by a set of decision
making units (DMUs) that exhibit best practices and then assigns the efﬁciency level to other
non-frontier units according to their distances to the efﬁcient frontier. The basic idea has since
generated a wide range of variations in measuring efﬁciency. Today, various DEA efﬁciency
models, such as the constant returns to scale (CRS) model, the variable-returns-to-scale (VRS)
model, the additive model, the slacks-based measures and the free disposal hull (FDH) model,
etc. are available for different types of measuring requirement. It also has been applied to various
industrial and non-industrial contexts, such as banking, education, hospital, etc. (Emrouznejad et.
al., 2008).
Pioneers of data envelopment analysis (DEA) may not have expected that their ideas
have inspired the thinking of a group of researchers and have been developed collectively into a
widely accepted academic ﬁeld. Thirty some years after the publication of the seminal paper by
Charnes et. al., (1978), the development continues and has not seen any signs of weakening. In
2009 alone, more than 700 DEA papers were published. Up through the year 2009, the ﬁeld has
accumulated approximately 4500 papers in ISI Web of Science database.
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2.6.1 DEA applied to healthcare systems
Since the early 1980s, Hollingsworth (2008) reviewed papers that had used efficiency
analysis to measure and analyze the productive performance of healthcare services. As shown in
Figure 2.6, DEA has been used in over 75 per cent of frontier efficiency analysis, and
furthermore over 50 per cent of applications are in hospitals. Most studies use output (or
throughput) measures of physical performance, such as inpatient days or discharges. There is
some use, in 9 per cent of studies, of outcome measures examining changes in health status,
mortality or quality of care for individuals treated. Input variables are mainly measures of staff
and capital employed, and most analysis is of technical efﬁciency.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 2.6: (a) Methods and (b) areas of app.lication in efficiency analysis of healthcare
services. Hollingsworth (2008).

2.6.2 DEA and negotiation science
The literature on negotiation and group decision making is broad and diverse. The ﬁeld is
multidisciplinary, involving different approaches by social psychologists, economists, and
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management scientists. Reviewing published papers regard to multiple criteria decision making
(MCDM) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), Wallenius et. al., (2008) stated that
MCDM/MAUT has begun to penetrate many new areas of research and applications such as
decision analysis, mathematical programming, DEA, and negotiation analysis. Yet, MCDM and
DEA developed separately; Belton (1992) and Doyle and Green (1993) described the
relationships between the two. Subsequently, Joro et. al., (1998) developed a detailed
understanding of the structural (mathematical) relationship between DEA and MOLP, and noted
the close similarities that exist.
Negotiation is a way for parties to reach agreement in a dispute or in making a joint
decision. In general, negotiations involve one or more issues that need to be settled between two
or more involved parties (Raiﬀa, 1982). DEA app.roach, according to Cook and Seiford (2009),
is a non-parametric technique which allows us to measure, by solving a linear programming
system, the performance of a subject and to assign to it a score representing its efﬁciency
performance. In a recent publication, Wang and Zionts (2008) tied together various existing
material on negotiation, and propose a quantitative framework, based on existing research
concepts, for carrying out negotiations. The authors used analysis similar to DEA to come up
with a measure of efficiency and to choose the best alternative with various input and output
measures.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to determine relative efficiencies between
decision making units (DMU) which was first developed by Charnes et. al., (1978). A DMU can
be any entity, but in this manuscript it refers to the different reimbursement models. DEA helps
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient DMUs (reimbursement models). Linear
Programming is the platform for which DEA analyzes the different reimbursement models. It
uses a non-parametric method which does not need a production function to determine efficiency
which is the DMU output/ DMU input ratio. The goal is to enhance efficiency by decreasing
inputs or increasing outputs. This implies in this manuscript to reducing PACs to enhance
hospital profitability.
DEA can be compared to statistical regression analysis as it has similar objectives.
Regression provides the “average” performance of a DMU, but DEA compares all the DMUs to
the most efficient DMU being analyzed. The advantage of DEA is that the most efficient DMU
becomes the “benchmark”. This DMU becomes a target for other less efficient DMUs in the
reference set. Regression analysis does not distinguish the efficient DMU from the inefficient
DMUs.
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3.1 DEA formulation
The DEA model considers a set of n DMUs where each DMU j, (j=1,...,n) uses m inputs
xij (i=1,...,m) to generate s outputs yrj (r=1,...,s). Given that all inputs and outputs are not equally
weighted, multipliers are introduced to distinguish among inputs and outputs. If the multipliers
u r , vi associated with outputs r and inputs i, respectively, are known, then conventional

beneﬁt/cost theory can express DMU technical eﬃciency e j as the ratio of weighted outputs to
weighted inputs.

u r y rj
r

vi xij
(3.1)

i

According to Cook and Seiford (2009), the beneﬁt/cost ratio above is the basis for the
standard engineering ratio of productivity. In the absence of known multipliers, Charnes et. al.,
(1978) proposed deriving appropriate multipliers for a given DMU by solving a particular nonlinear programming problem. Charnes et. al., (1978) model for measuring the DMU technical
eﬃciency is provided for the following fractional programming problem:
eo

max

u r y ro
r

v i x io
i

s.t.

u r y rj
r

u r , vi

v i x ij

0,

j

(3.2)

i

0,

r , i.

where, ε is a non-Archimedean value designed to enforce strict positivity on the variables.
Equation 3.2 is referred to as the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) model. It provides for
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS). This original publication on DEA simply restricted the
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variables to be non-negative (ε=0). The imposition of a strictly positive lower limit (ε>0) was
introduced in a follow-up paper, Charnes et. al., (1981).
It is essential to point out that the CCR model in Equation (3.2) is referred to as the inputoriented minimization model. The inversion of the CCR model illustrated in Equation (3.2) is
referred to as the output-oriented minimization problem. This fractional programming problem is
converted to linear programming problem by applying the Charnes and Cooper (1962) theory.
This specifically refers to changing µr = tur and υi = tvi, such that t

vx
i i io

1

. The linear

programming formulation is presented in Equation. (3.3).
eo

max

r

y ro

r

s.t.

i x io

1

(3.3)

i
r

y rj

i x ij

r
r,

0,

j

i
i

,

r , i.

The equivalent minimization linear programming formulation is presented in equation
(3.4).

(3.4)
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Equation (3.4) is referred to as the envelopment or primal problem, and Equation (3.3) is
the multiplier or dual problem. To get a geometric appreciation for the CRS model, one can
represent problem (3.3) in a graphical form such as Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: single input single output example. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009)

Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of a single input single output case. Solving Equation
(3.3) for each of the DMUs illustrates that DMU #2 is the most efficient. The efficient frontier is
plotted by connecting a line from the origin through DMU #2. Any DMUs to the right of this
efficient frontier line represents the inefficient DMUs. For example DMU #3 is an inefficient
DMU. Its projection to the efficient frontier is represented by the point 3*. The relative
efficiency of DMU #3 is measured as the ratio A/B = 4.2/6 = .70. DMU #3 is 70% as efficient as
DMU #2.
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An alternative geometric view of Equation (3.3) is provided in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: A two input one output example. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009)

Solving Equation (3.3) results in DMUs A, B, C and D being identified as eﬃcient (, i.e.,
θA = θB = θC = θD = 100%). The CCR model is appropriately utilized to provide the radial
projection. Specifically, each input is reduced by the same proportionality factor θ. DMU E θE =
83.3% efficient, and the resulting projected value

*
E xE

is simply the frontier DMU B. DMU B is

the ‘‘benchmark” for DMU E. DMU G projection to the efficient frontier is point K. Therefore
DMU B and DMU C are appropriate benchmarks for DMU G.
DEA has been universally recognized as a useful tool of performance assessment, but
very often more than one DMU is evaluated as DEA efﬁcient, which makes DEA efﬁcient units
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unable to be compared or ranked. Therefore, the assurance region concept was developed,
initially by Thompson et. al. (1986, 1990) to prohibit large differences in the values of
multipliers, and imposes constraints on the relative magnitudes of those multipliers. In this
manuscript the non-Archimedean condition is

m
i 1

1

xio

. This discrimination impact of

assurance region restrictions can be visualized in Figure 3.3. DMUs that are eﬃcient in an
unrestricted setting (ε = 0), such as DMU D in Figure 3.2, may be rendered ineﬃcient as in
Figure 3.3. Details on imposing minimum weight restrictions on inputs and outputs to provide
discrimination between DMUs can be found in Wang et. al. (2009).

Figure 3.3: Impact of assurance region restrictions. (Source: Cook and Seiford, 2009)
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3.2 PCA formulation
3.2.1 Overview
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical technique first
introduced by Hotelling (1933) to explain variance-covariance structure in a data set, using linear
combinations of the original variables. According to Johnson and Wichern (2007) and Rencher
(2002), its main objectives are: (1) reduction of dimensionality, and (2) data interpretation.
Although q components are necessary to reproduce the overall variability of a system,
most of this variability can be represented by a small number k of principal components. This
means that there is almost as much information on k principal components as in the q original
variables. Therefore, the general idea of PCA is that k principal components can be substituted,
without significant loss of information, by q original variables. The original data set consisting of
n positions (of observations) of the q variables is reduced to a set of n positions (scores) of k
principal components.
According to Rencher (2002), PCA often reveals relationships that were not previously
identified with the original set, which results in a broader interpretation of the phenomenon
under study. Johnson and Wichern (2007) validate PCA as an intermediate step in the data
analysis.
Gabrielsson et. al. (2003b) define PCA as a least squares fit of a straight line or a
plane/hyperplane that is N-dimensional (for data) in a K-dimensional space of principal
components. In the case presented by Figure 3.4 which is adapted from Gabrielsson et. al.
(2003b), the data are centered on the average and three original variables are described by only
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two principal components. The object is projected onto the mathematical plane described by the
components, and the scores on each component are obtained by determining the distances
between the origin and the projected object. Eigenvectors, also called "loadings", represent the
coefficients of direction of the fitted plan. The perpendicular distance between the object and the
plane is the distance to the model.

Figure 3.4: Geometric interpretation of PCA. (Source: Gabrielsson et. al., 2003)

3.2.2 Algebraic approach
Principal component analysis is one of the most widely used tools applied to summarize
common patterns of variation among variables. Algebraically, it is a linear combination

of q

random variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq. Geometrically, these combinations represent a new coordinate
system obtained during the rotation of the original system (Johnson and Wichern, 2007;
Mukherjee and Ray, 2008; Paiva et. al.,2008; Peruchi et. al., 2013). The axes are now the
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variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq and represent the direction of maximum variance. Principal components
are uncorrelated and depend only on the covariance matrix Σ (or the correlation matrix ρ) of the
variables Y1, Y2, …, Yq and its development does not require the assumption of multivariate
normality .
The required information to obtain the scores of the first principal component (PC1), as
defined by Johnson and Wichern (2002), come from the linear combination that is able to
maximize the variance, in accordance with Equation (3.5).
Maximize : Var e1 Y
Subject to : e1e1

(3.5)

1

In the optimization problem above, the product of the decision variables are limited to
unit length, for eliminating indeterminacy of the solution, since e1 can be multiplied by any
scalar. To obtain the scores of the second principal component (PC2), the problem represented in
Equation (3.5) is changed into Equation (3.6) to guarantee PC1 and PC2 being orthogonal
vectors.
Maximize : Var e 2 Y
Subject to : e 2 e 2

(3.6)

1

Cov e1 Y, e 2 Y

0

In general, the ith principal component is the solution for the linear combination e i CTQ
which maximizes the variance in Equation (3.7):
Maximize : Var e i Y
Subject to : e i e i

(3.7)

1

Cov e i Y, e k Y

0

para

k

i
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The result of the lexicographical optimization problem described above determines the
eigenvalues as solution to the objective function and the optimal solution of the decision
variables which are represented by the eigenvectors of each principal component. Using the pairs
of eigenvalues and eigenvectors of each principal component (λ1, e1), (λ2, e2), ..., (λq, eq) where λ1
≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λq ≥ 0, the principal component scores can be calculated by linear combination below
e i Y e1i Y1 e 2i Y2  e qi Yq i 1,2, , q

PC i

(3.8)

as well as the percentage of explanation of the ith principal component using
i

i 1,2,, q

q
j 1

(3.9)

j

The principal components may also be obtained by the standardized variables
X1

Z1

1
11

X2

Z2

2

(3.10)

22




Xq

Zq

q
qq

In matrix notation,
Z

V1 2

1

X μ

(3.11)

where V 1 2 is the diagonal matrix of standard deviation. Clearly, E (Z) = 0, and
Cov Z

V1 2

1

Σ V1 2

1

ρ . The principal components scores of Z can be obtained from the

eigenvectors of the correlation matrix ρ of Y. All previous results apply, with some
simplifications, since the variance of each Zi is unity. The notation will be the same for PCi
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referring to the ith principal component and (λi, ei) for pairs of eigenvalue-eigenvector of the
matrix Σ or ρ. However, (λi, ei) derived from Σ is generally not exactly the same as derived from
ρ.
Johnson and Wichern (2007) determine that the assumption of multivariate normality is
not required. Moreover, Σ̂ has pairs of eigenvalues-eigenvectors λˆ i , eˆ i that are the same for the
matrix sample variance-covariance S. Therefore, both S and Σ̂ provide the same sample
principal components e i Y and the same percentage of explained variance

q
i

j 1

j

i 1,2, , q .

Finally, both S and Σ̂ provide the same correlation matrix R, then if the variables are
standardized, the choice of S or Σ̂ is irrelevant.
3.2.3 Deciding how many principal components to analyze
In any application, a decision should be taken in relation to how many principal
components should be retained to effectively represent the original data set. Rencher (2002)
proposed some guidelines which are explained below:
•

Hold components able to sufficiently explain a specific percentage of the original data
variance, for example, 80%.

•

Hold components that the eigenvalues are larger than the average of eigenvalues
p
i 1 i

•

p . For the correlation matrix, the average is 1.

Utilize the scree plot, which shows λi versus i, to distinguish the "large" eigenvalues to
the "small" eigenvalues.

•

Test the significance of the "larger" eigenvalues.

51

Johnson and Wichern (2007) state that there is no definitive method to determine how
many components to retain in the analysis. However, some things must be taken into
consideration are the amount of variance explained, eigenvalues size and interpretation of the
principal components of the subject discussed. The authors also state that the scree plot is a
useful visual method. Furthermore, the authors suggest retaining the principal components that
are able to explain a proportion of at least 1/p of the total variance. Johnson and Winchern (2007)
have emphasized that there is no definitive rule regarding how many principal components to be
retained in the study. It is recommended that a combination of techniques mentioned above or
even multiple analyses be considered for different amounts of principal components.
3.2.4 Interpretation of the principal components
Note that the principal components generated by the matrix R are not compatible with
those obtained by the matrix S. In cases that the variance between the original variables have
significant discrepancy, the matrix R can provide better results. For example, if a variable
displays a much higher variance than others in the original data set, this variable will dominate
the first principal component.
3.2.5 Rotation
The principal components are initially obtained by the axes rotation in order to align with
the natural variability of the system, in which new variables become uncorrelated and reflect the
direction of maximum variance. Figure 3.5 illustrates the rotation imposed on the axes composed
by the original variables (y1 and y2) to obtain the principal components (z1 and z2) based on
Rencher’s (2002) analysis. Note that the line formed by the major axis seems to be a regression
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line (Figure 3.6). The perpendicular distance from any point to this line is minimized rather than
simply minimizing the vertical distance.

Figure 3.5: Principal component transformation for the sons data. (Source: Rencher, 2002)

Figure 3.6: The first principal component as a perpendicular regression line. (Source:
Rencher, 2002)
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3.2.6 Correlation between original variables and principal components
Denote the correlation between the ith variable yi and jth principal component zj by ryizj.
Since the vectors zj are orthogonal, the relationship can be written as a joint quadratic correlation
as defined in Equation (3.12):
ry2i z1

ry2i z2  ry2i zk

R y2i z1 ,, zk

(3.12)

Where, k is the number of components retained and R y2i z1 ,, zk is the multiple squared
correlation (or coefficient of determination) of an yi given the zj. Note that an inverse analysis
from R z2i y1 ,, yk would be inconclusive because of multi-collinearity present in the data set of the
original variables. A recommended analysis by Rencher (2002) interprets the coefficients
obtained from the extracted eigenvectors of the matrix R or S.
3.3 DEA-PCA formulation
Zhu (1998) suggested that the principal component analysis could be applied to ‘output
divided by input’ ratios as a complementary approach to DEA. The idea of combining DEA and
PCA methodologies to achieve dimension reduction was developed independently by Ueda and
Hoshiai (1997) and Adler and Golany (2001, 2002). These papers suggest that the variables can
be divided into groups, based on their logical composition with respect to the production process,
and then replaced with principal components representing each group separately. If most of the
population variance can be attributed to the ﬁrst few components, then they can replace the
original variables with minimal loss of information. Let the random vector Y = [Y1 ,Y2 ,. . .,Yq ]
(in our case the original inputs or outputs chosen to be aggregated) possess the covariance matrix
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Σ with eigenvalues λ1≥ λ2≥…≥ λq ≥ 0 and normalized eigenvectors e1, e2, …, eq. The new
variables, commonly known as principal components, are weighted sums of the original data
which are represented by the linear combination in Equation (3.13).
YPCi

ei Y

Var YPCi

λi

e i Ye i

Cov YPCi , YPCk

e i Ye k

(3.13)
0, i 1,2,..., q, k

1,2,..., q, i

k

The principal components, YPC1, YPC2,..., YPCq , are the uncorrelated linear combinations
ranked by their variances in descending order. The complete set of principal components is as
large as the original set of variables. Ey is the matrix of all ei whose dimensions drop from q x q
to h x q, as principal components are dropped (Ypc becomes an h x n matrix). Principal
components can be used to replace all the inputs and/or outputs simultaneously or as specified
groups of variables with a common theme. Thus linear program in Equation (3.14) refers to both
the original data and principal components in order to present a generalized formulation (Adler
and Yazhemsky, 2010).
eo

max

U o O oa

U pcO apc

s.t.

Vo I oa

V pc I apc

1

Vo I oa

V pc I apc

U o O oa

Vo

0

Uo

0

U pcO apc

0

(3.14)

V pc E i

0

U pc E o

0

V pc and U pc are free
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Subscript “o” is the index of original variables and “pc” is the index of principal components; Ipc
represents an m x n input matrix; Opc an r x n output matrix; Ia and Oa input and output column
vectors for DMUa respectively. V and U are multipliers for inputs and outputs.
Using principal components in place of original data does not affect the properties of the
DEA models. Principal components represent the selection of a new coordinate system obtained
by rotating the original system with x1,..., xq as the coordinate axes rather than the parallel
translation of the coordinate system. Thus PCA–DEA may be applied to all basic DEA models
despite their lack of translation or units invariance. The disadvantage of PCA–DEA is that the
data must be transformed and then, once results are obtained, it must be transformed back to the
original form in order to ﬁnd the targets for improvement. The results obtained from DEA with
respect to each DMU reﬂect its position within the production possibility set relative to the
efﬁcient section of the boundary. The imposition of weights restrictions in DEA will render parts
of the efﬁcient boundary of the production possibility set no longer efﬁcient.
Allen et. al., (1997) and Dyson et. al., (2001) interpreted inefﬁciency rating,
improvement targets and efﬁcient peers under weights restrictions. The targets and efﬁcient peers
obtained could reﬂect a substantial change in the current mix of input–output levels of the
inefﬁcient DMUs. A similar phenomenon occurs under the PCA–DEA formulation (as a result of
the free sign in PCA). However, problems related to discrimination often arise. In extreme cases,
the majority of DMUs may prove efﬁcient, which means that there is a need for a trade-off
between complete DEA information and the need to improve discrimination. It may be
reasonable to argue that a decrease in one input accompanied by an increase in another input may
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well lead to a more efﬁcient DMU. PCA–DEA affects the DEA results in a similar manner to
adding weight restrictions but without additional preferential information from decision makers.
Dropping several principal components that generally do not explain the variance appears to
reduce the edges of the frontier. Thus removing the extreme (super-efﬁcient) DMUs is generally
in line with the cone-ratio or assurance region constraints.
3.4 DEA Approach Applied to Negotiate Reimbursement Plans in Healthcare Systems Detailed procedure
The stepwise procedure, proposed by Feng and Antony (2010), presented in Figure (3.7)
was used as a roadmap for Six Sigma practitioners to implement their DEA-enhanced projects.
The procedure can also be utilized for Six Sigma Black Belts projects. This detailed procedure is
adapted to negotiate reimbursement plans in healthcare systems in this manuscript. The Six
Sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control) roadmap is utilized to illustrate
the development of the DEA combined with PCA to determine the most appropriate
reimbursement plan that healthcare facility can negotiate with insurance companies based on
reduction of PACs. If the provider decides to apply a specific reimbursement model, the
practitioner must perform DMAIC phases; otherwise, DMAC phases are sufficient to rank and to
identify which payment model is the best alternative based on PACs. Figure (3.8) shows how to
perform the step A6 in which the practitioner have to apply an appropriate DEA model to obtain
efficiency scores for DMUs.
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START

D1. Identify the decision-making units
(DMUs)

I9. Provide reference set for inefficient
units

D2. Define inputs and outputs involved
in assessing DMUs` efficiency

I10. Set performance targets for all units

M3. Develop data collection plan

C11. Validate improvement by pilot
studies

M4. Collect inputs and outputs data

C12. Verify benefits, cost savings and
profit growth

M5. Verify data accuracy and reliability

END

A6. Apply appropriate DEA models to
obtain efficiency scores for DMUs

A7. Analyze relatively efficient DMU

A8. Analyze relatively inefficient DMUs

Y
Particular model?
N

Figure 3.7: Stepwise procedure to apply DEA-DMAIC roadmap as an add tool to negotiate
reimbursement plans in healthcare systems (adapted from Feng and Antony, 2010).
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A6

A6.1 Apply CCR model

Good
discrimination?

Y

A7

N

A6.2 Assess correlation between PACs

Significant
correlations?

N

Y
A6.3 Apply PCA

A6.4 Change constraint for the weights

Figure 3.8: procedure to apply the DEA model for obtaining efficiency scores for DMUs

3.4.1 Define phase
The Deﬁne phase of Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap usually outlines project goals, customer
deliverables, resources and the Critical-To-Quality (CTQ) characteristics. A typical DEAenhanced Six Sigma project involves the performance/productivity/efﬁciency evaluation among
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DMUs, which need to be clearly identiﬁed in the Deﬁne phase as well as the multiple inputs and
outputs of DMUs. The DMUs in a health organization can be individual physicians, nurses,
examination rooms or clinical departments. In this manuscript the DMUs are the reimbursement
models. The inputs may take forms of costs, salary, time, number of physicians/nurses in a clinic
and other resources. This research has considered PAC costs. The outputs of the function
performed by the DMUs can be number of patients or number of severe cases. In this manuscript
the output was the cost savings associated to PACs.
There are six different DMUs used in the research as described in Chapter 3. The DMUs
in my research are six types of payment models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service,
PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered
to build a strategic optimization model. There are
The variables to be considered are inpatient procedural (AMI, Pneumonia, and Stroke)
and inpatient medical (Knee, Hip, BARI, COLON, and CABG). The input from these variables
consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC
readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly
dependent in how much hospital can save.

3.4.2 Measure phase
The Measure phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap quantiﬁes and benchmarks the
process based on actual data. Six Sigma requires that data be collected accurately and reliably.
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Otherwise, ‘garbage in and garbage out’ phenomena would happen regardless of the model
utilized for analysis. Therefore, this phase involves developing a collection plan, collecting data,
and verifying data accuracy and reliability. For the reimbursement models considered in this
manuscript the data is usually deterministic, rather than random variables. This data is based on
observations from past decisions (inputs) and resultant outputs (Feng and Antony, 2010).
The data used in the model is from Healthcare Incentive Improvement Institute, Inc.
Their website www.hci3.org has data for public use. The data for the research is from CMMI
Bundled Payment Pilot Analysis Package (a national database with over 4.7 million people
covered).
3.4.3 Analyze phase
The Analyze phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap intends to apply the DEA model
developed in this manuscript to select the best reimbursement plan. This analysis is performed at
three different levels:
1. Individual analyses for each DRGs;
2. Analyses of DRG groups;
3. Aggregated analysis.
3.4.4 Improve phase
The Improve phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap determines the best solution using
optimization approaches. In this manuscript, improve phase will be performed only if the
provider decides to select their reimbursement model for very specific types of DRGs. There is a
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chance that selected model not being considered efficient; therefore, DEA can show which PAC
should be reduced to make the selected model more efficient.
3.4.5 Control phase
The Control phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC roadmap checks the process for statistically
signiﬁcance before/after the improvement. Controls need to be implemented to hold the gains,
which involve monitoring DMUs’ performance, developing corrective procedures and training
people who run the process.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Section 1
There are six different DMUs used in the research. The DMUs in my research are six
types of payment models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service, PROMETHEUS and
Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered to build a strategic
optimization model. There are
The variables to be considered are inpatient procedural (AMI, Pneumonia, and Stroke)
and inpatient medical (Knee, Hip, BARI, COLON, and CABG). The input from these variables
consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC
readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly
dependent in how much hospital can save.
An application of the DMAIC procedure is presented in section 4.1 for a single
DRG, AMI. Next, the analyses for the remaining DRGs as well as an overall assessment are
shown in section 4.2.
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4.1 Application for a single DRG
4.1.1 Define phase

There are six different DMUs used in the research. These DMUs, six types of payment
models grouped into three categories: Fee-for-service, PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2,
Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4), will be considered to build a strategic optimization model.
The input from these variables consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional,
PAC treatment (PAC Rx), PAC readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of
PAC professional, PAC treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more
than 10%, which is mainly dependent on how much hospital can save.
4.1.2 Measure phase

The data used in the model is a publicly available data from www.hci3.org. The
Prometheus playbook available on the website has data that comes from their developmental
database (a national database with over 4.7 million covered lives). The numbers for the
optimization model were derived from the playbook.

4.1.3 Analyze phase
To assess the relative efﬁciency, the input-oriented CCR model in Equation (3.3) was
speciﬁed for this problem with five inputs and one output. The linear programming model was
easily solved using Excel Solver for j0 = 1, ..., 6. Each time the model was suitably modiﬁed for
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the unit being assessed. Figure (4.1) shows the model being executed by the DMU,
PROMETHEUS. The obtained optimal values for

r

,

i

and e0 provide information on the

weights for inputs and outputs and the DEA score for the respective unit. This information can
be further used to rank DEA scores, identify the reference set and set the performance target.

Model/ AMI

FFS
PROMETHEUS
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4
Weights
>=
1.9271E-05

Inputs
Typical
PAC
PAC IP
Added
Episode Professional PAC Rx Readdmission Burden
$24,467
$24,467
$22,232
$18,295
$22,382
$42,374

$2,551
$2,551
$1,020
$1,410
$1,256
$2,665

$151
$151
$125
$173
$154
$326

1.93E-05 1.9271E-05 1.9E-05
0.2

0.2

0.2

Output
Savings

$17,703
$17,703
$6,242.94
$8,631.36
$7,687.98
$16,319

$7,019
$7,019
$3,017.42
$4,171.82
$3,715.86
$7,888

1.9271E-05

1.93E-05 0.000365

0.2

0.2

0
$2,742.43
$1,040.49
$1,438.56
$1,281.33
$2,719.89

Constraints
Sum
Inputs

Sum
Outputs

1.00
1.00
0.63
0.63
0.68
1.34

0.00
1.00
0.38
0.52
0.47
0.99

e0
0%
100%
60%
83%
69%
74%

1
(1.00)
(0.00)
(0.25)
(0.11)
(0.21)
(0.35)

2
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=

0
0
0
0
0
0

1.00
1.00
0.63
0.63
0.68
1.34

=
=
=
=
=
=

1

Figure 4.1: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU PROMETHEUS

The optimal value of e0 indicates the DEA score for each unit, which is shown in Figure
4.1. If the DEA score equals to 100% and the constraints 1 and 2 are attended, the unit being
assessed is said to be efﬁcient. Therefore, PROMETHEUS was the unique DMU considered
efficient when analyzing the dataset for the DRG, AMI.

4.1.4 Improve phase
The results from the DEA’s solution can be interpreted to provide reference sets for
inefﬁcient units and to set performance targets for all units. However, these steps are required in

1
1
1
1
1
1
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situations where the provider has already decided to implement a particular reimbursement plan
and the selected plan was considered inefficient. For instance, a particular hospital has decided to
implement “Model 3+4”. Figure 4.2 show that the efficiency was assessed in 74% and the
reference set for this DMU is the DMU PROMETHEUS (constraint 1 for DMU PROMETHEUS
was equal to zero, or

v i x ij ). Therefore, performance targets for the DMU Model

u r y rj
r

i

3+4 could be set, based on reducing PACs according to the results for the efficient DMU in CCR
model analysis.

Model/ AMI

FFS
PROMETHEUS
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4
Weights
>=
1.9271E-05

Inputs
Typical
PAC
PAC IP
Added
Episode Professional PAC Rx Readdmission Burden
$24,467
$24,467
$22,232
$18,295
$22,382
$42,374

$2,551
$2,551
$1,020
$1,410
$1,256
$2,665

$151
$151
$125
$173
$154
$326

1.44E-05 1.43735E-05 1.4E-05
0.2

0.2

0.2

$17,703
$17,703
$6,242.94
$8,631.36
$7,687.98
$16,319
1.43735E-05
0.2

$7,019
$7,019
$3,017.42
$4,171.82
$3,715.86
$7,888

Output
Savings
0
$2,742.43
$1,040.49
$1,438.56
$1,281.33
$2,719.89

Constraints
Sum
Inputs

Sum
Outputs

0.75
0.75
0.47
0.47
0.51
1.00

0.00
0.75
0.28
0.39
0.35
0.74

e0
0%
100%
60%
83%
69%
74%

1
(0.75)
(0.00)
(0.19)
(0.08)
(0.16)
(0.26)

2
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=

0
0
0
0
0
0

0.75
0.75
0.47
0.47
0.51
1.00

=
=
=
=
=
=

1
1
1
1
1
1

1.44E-05 0.000272
0.2

1

Figure 4.2: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU Model 3+4

4.1.5 Control phase

Validation of the savings obtained from adoption of a particular model must be assessed
in order to confirm that the model selected was the benchmark. The analyst can also monitor
PACs using statistical control charts, which have been widely used in healthcare applications for
monitoring and improvement of hospital performance. PACs in healthcare systems can be
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compared to defects in manufacturing context. Therefore, after identifying the best
reimbursement model, the hospital can track PACs in its processes to achieve higher benefits,
cost savings and profit growth.
4.2 Remaining DRGs and overall analyses

The summarized results are presented in Table 4.2 and in Figure 4.3. Table is color coded
for easier understanding, where red color means least efficient, green the most efficient model
and yellow somewhere in the middle. As expected FFS is the least efficient model among all the
models of reimbursement since providers do not save anything. The Table 4.2 below has an
empty box for Model 4 in DRG BARI column, which means episode of BARI does not extend
long and so there is no data available to see how much was spent on it and how much could be
saved. If provider can negotiate for Model 4 reimbursement model for BARI, it would be 100%
saving for them!
From Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 it can be deduced that PROMETHEUS is the most
efficient model for most of the DRGs considered in the study. Model 3 and Model 4 are most
efficient for COLON and CABG respectively. In case of Pneumonia and Hip replacement,
Model 4 along with PROMETHEUS is the most efficient model of reimbursement.
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Table 4.2: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for all DRGs and Sum of all DRGs
evaluated using CCR-DEA Optimization Model

CCR-DEA
FFS
PROMETHEUS
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4

All
0%
100%
72%
97%
66%
82%

AMI
0%
100%
60%
83%
69%
74%

Pneumonia Stroke Knee Hip
0%
0% 0% 0%
100% 100% 100% 100%
75%
72% 68% 83%
80%
34% 88% 74%
100% 21% 50% 100%
35%
21% 88% 48%

BARI Colon CABG
0% 0% 0%
100% 88% 55%
70% 100% 26%
66% 78% 100%
#DIV/0! 89% 66%
33% 67% 72%

Figure 4.3: Relative Efficiency of DMUs for all DRGs and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using
CCR-DEA Optimization Model

Section 2
Firstly, section 4.3 shows an application to a group of DRGs using a PCA-DEA
approach. Some steps are described more briefly due to similarity to previous section. As long as
the problem is the same, only a different perspective is introduced to determine a new point of
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view when evaluating group of DRGs, in this case, medical inpatient. Secondly, result analyses
are extended to procedural group of DRGs and an overall assessment in section 4.4.
4.3 Application to a group of DRGs
4.1.1 Define phase

As mentioned in section 4.1, DMUs assessed in this manuscript are: Fee-for-service,
PROMETHEUS and Bundled (Model 2, Model 3, Model 4 and Model 3+4). The input from
these variables consists of cost of Typical Episode, PAC professional, PAC treatment (PAC Rx),
PAC readmission and Added burden. And the output is 10% of sum of PAC professional, PAC
treatment, PAC readmission and Added burden. Output can be more than 10%, which is mainly
dependent in how much hospital can save.

4.1.2 Measure phase

The data used in the model is a publicly available data from www.hci3.org. The
Prometheus playbook available on the website has data that comes from their developmental
database (a national database with over 4.7 million covered lives). The numbers for the
optimization model were derived from the playbook. Medical inpatient was the group of DRGs
analyzed in this section.
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4.1.3 Analyze phase
To assess the relative efﬁciency, the input-oriented CCR model in Equation 3.3 was
speciﬁed for this problem with five inputs and one output. The linear programming model was
easily solved using Excel Solver for j0 = 1, ..., 6. Each time the model was suitably modiﬁed for
the unit being assessed. Figure 4.4 shows the model being executed for the DMU,
PROMETHEUS. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the discrimination between DMUs was not
satisfactory to identify which DMU was the most efficient. As a solution, the correlation
structure between PACs was evaluated to determine the feasibility of using PCA as a reduction
strategy of inputs, and consequently, improvement of the discrimination in this analysis. Figure
4.5 shows that most of the correlations between PACs were significant with 0.05 of significance
level.

Model/ AMI

FFS
PROMETHEUS
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4
Weights
>=
0

Inputs
Typical
PAC
PAC IP
Added
Episode Professional PAC Rx Readdmission Burden

Output

Constraints

Savings

Sum
Inputs

$548
$548
$296
$316
$253
$569

$62,399
$62,399
$14,149
$15,236
$8,496
$23,732

$24,831
$24,831
$6,005
$6,650
$4,035
$10,685

0
$9,366.88
$2,288.07
$2,478.97
$1,418.48
$3,897

$1
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0

1.68E-07 1.51924E-05

0

1.44729E-05

0

0.000107

0.005615 0.509251084

0

0.485133683

0

1

$44,144
$44,144
$42,798
$28,815
$42,951
$71,765

$5,892
$5,892
$2,431
$2,588
$1,401
$3,989

Sum
Outputs
$0
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0

e0
0%
100%
98%
100%
100%
100%

1
-$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

2
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=

0
0
0
0
0
0

$1
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0

Figure 4.4: Excel solver of CCR model being solved for the DMU PROMETHEUS

=
=
=
=
=
=

1
1
1
1
1
1
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Figure 4.5: Correlation structure between PACs

Figure 4.6 presents the principal component analysis for PACs of medical inpatients
based on the covariance matrix. As emphasized in Figure 4.6, only PC1 is enough to explain the
variability of the original data set. Therefore, PACs were replaced by the scores of principal
components and the CCR model was executed over again. The results in Table 4.2 determine
that the new model could distinguish better efficient from inefficient DMUs.

Fig 4.6: Principal component analysis for PACs
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Model/
Procedural
FFS
PROMETHEU
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4
Weights
>=
8.96E-06

Input
Typical
Episode
44144
44144
42798
28815
42951
71765

Out put
PC 1

0

67402
67402
15494
16748
9454
26202

0
6740
1549
1675
945
2620

Constraints
Sum
Sum
Effeciency
1
2
Inputs Outputs
1
0
0%
-1 <= 0 1 = 1
1
1
100%
0 <= 0 1 = 1
1
0
44%
0 <= 0 1 = 1
0
0
61%
0 <= 0 0 = 1
0
0
30%
0 <= 0 0 = 1
1
0
44%
0 <= 0 1 = 1

8.96E-06 8.96E-06 1.48E-04
0.5

0.5

1.0

Figure 4.7: Relative Efficiency of Model 4 Reimbursement Model for Procedural DRGs
evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization model

4.1.4 Improve phase
The results from the DEA’s solution can be interpreted to provide reference sets for
inefﬁcient units and to set performance targets for all units. Since the aim of this study is not
related to a particular reimbursement model, the improve phase was not performed for this
dataset.
4.1.5 Control phase

Validation of the savings obtained from adoption of a particular model must be assessed
in order to confirm that the model selected was the benchmark. The analyst can also monitor
PACs using statistical control charts, which have been widely used in healthcare applications for
monitoring and improvement of hospital performance. PACs in healthcare systems can be
compared to defects in manufacturing context. Using PCA, only one vector (PC1) represents the
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entire PAC dataset; thereby, an alternative control system may be implemented based on PC1
analysis.

4.4 Application to the groups procedural and medical inpatient and overall analyses

The PCA-DEA optimization model was run for both procedural and medical inpatients
group of DRGs as well as for sum of all the DRGs. The summary of results is presented in Table
4.2 and Figure 4.8.

Table 4.2: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for Procedural and Medical DRGs
and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization Model

PCA-DEA
FFS
PROMETHEUS
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 3+4

All Procedural Medical
0%
0%
0%
100% 100%
83%
60% 44%
60%
96% 61%
100%
61% 30%
71%
79% 44%
86%
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Figure 4.8: Summary of Relative Efficiency of DMUs for Procedural and Medical DRGs
and Sum of all DRGs evaluated using PCA-DEA Optimization Model
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The PPACA law or the Obama care aims at improving the quality and increasing the
affordability of health insurance. The law also aims to reduce escalating healthcare costs and
improve healthcare outcomes by moving from current quantity driven system to more quality
driven system. To improve accountability in the delivery of healthcare, Medicare & Medicaid
and private insurers have developed several reimbursement plans/models as mentioned in
Chapter 1.
Payment is not the only factor influencing the behavior of provider and patient, but its
importance has been recognized. The importance of aligning payment policies with quality
improvement has been emphasized in “Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the
21st century” (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The committee has called for all the purchasers to
come together and look at their payment policies to removes the barriers that impede
improvement. They have mentioned the importance of stronger incentives in quality
improvement.
According to Jencks et. al., (2009), Medicare readmissions because are frequent cost a lot
to the overall healthcare system, including to the hospitals. To address this situation policy
makers are increasingly interested in solving the problem by pushing for new reimbursement
plans. These reimbursement and environmental changes combined together have put great
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pressure on financial performance of hospitals. In some cases the stress has been so much so that
it resulted in closure of the hospital.
One of the critical factors in financial success of all industries is how well it manages its
costs. The introduction of prospective payment systems and managed competition, has
diminished the importance of cost management as a single critical factor. “Reimbursement
changes create the need to maintain and stabilize revenue streams, and revenue factors are
emerging as key corollaries to hospital financial success.”
In such a dynamic environment, where hospitals are closing or are being bought by
bigger hospitals or insurance companies, it becomes important for not only their survival but also
their financial success that they have a strategy while negotiation for reimbursement contracts
with insurance companies. The DEA optimization model that we have built can serve both as an
optimization model as well as a strategic tool for providers’ success, by aligning the incoming
patient population with the possible financial incentives.
All the different reimbursement models in the research were analyzed using the
publically available data from data from HCI3. As promised at the beginning of the research, our
model has the ability not only to assess which reimbursement model works best for which DRG,
but also capable of ranking in their order of efficiency. We have also analyzed different
reimbursement models based on different groups of DRGs, namely procedural and medical
inpatient. The results are different from when analyzed for each DRG and all the DRGs together.
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One of the disadvantages of CCR-DEA optimization model is its poor resolution among
DMUs. Optimization using PCA along with DEA provides better resolution between
reimbursement models that seem to have similar relative efficiencies, which can help in quick
decision making. From our literature survey and to the best of our knowledge, PCA has not been
used before in conjunction with DEA in healthcare settings.
Our results show DEA can be serve as a negotiation tool in healthcare negotiations. DEA
when combined with PCA has more power to discriminate among different DMUs, as seen in
Figure 4.8, which can help hospitals to choose from various closely efficient reimbursement
models. Based on the results from our optimization model, the DRGs that are more profitable or
more efficient or have more number of patients being treated, the providers can decide about
their future investment. Figure 3.7 explains stepwise procedure to apply DEA-DMAIC roadmap
as an add tool to negotiate reimbursement plans in healthcare systems.
The ability of our optimization model to analyze the efficiency of reimbursement models
at so many levels gives it a potential to be a strategic tool that can help providers not only
negotiate with different insurers but also provide competitive edge in the market.
Our optimization model will not only help financial health of hospitals but also force
them to provide quality service to the patients as mentioned in Obama care Act.
For future research more DRGs could be included for overall optimization. DEA also has
a potential to be used in clinical efficiency which affects the financial outcome of the hospitals.
People behavior in different organization and how it affects their efficiency is another area of

77

future research. DEA combined when combined with other techniques like PCA, MCDM or
MAUT can provide a robust tool for calculating efficiency in almost all the fields.
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